Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Redlining by DeWolfe, Ruthanne et al.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 2 Winter 1980 Article 3 
Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Redlining 
Ruthanne DeWolfe 
Gregory Squires 
Alan DeWolfe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Ruthanne DeWolfe, Gregory Squires & Alan DeWolfe, Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Redlining , 29 
DePaul L. Rev. 315 (1980) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol29/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF
INSURANCE REDLINING
Ruthanne DeWolfe,* Gregory Squires,**
and Alan DeWolfe***
In a recent study of insurance redlining the Midwestern State Ad-
visory Committees to the United States Commission on Civil Rights
deternined that Chicago communities with predominantly minority
populations were the principal victims of adverse underwriting de-
cisions. In this article, the authors, focusing on Illinois, discuss
various theories of liability for insurance redlining.
With increasing frequency, residents of urban areas are complaining that
they cannot obtain essential property insurance at affordable rates through
the voluntary market. These complaints are being registered with commu-
nity organizations, 1 state insurance regulatory officers, 2 and city, 3 state, 4
and federal 5 legislative committees. In many cases, the complaints go
beyond individual grievances and charge that entire neighborhoods are un-
able to obtain property insurance. 6 This practice of denying insurance to
residents of a particular geographic area has come to be known as insurance
"redlining. "7
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Heidelberg College; M.S., Ph.D., Northwestern University; J.D., DePaul University College of
Law.
** Research/Writer, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Midwestern Regional Office. B.S.,
Northwestern University; M.A., Ph.D., Michigan State University.
*** Professor of Psychology, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Oberlin College;
M.S., Ph.D., Northwestern University.
1. Address by G. Cincotta, National Training and Information Center, Insurance Redlin-
ing and Reinvestment: Directions for Change Conference (Chicago, Ill., March 23, 1979).
2. A. Valukas & R. Bollow, An Investigation of Discrimination in the Sale of Homeowners
Insurance in Illinois 8 (Sept. 6, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Valukas & Bollow]; ILLINOIS
DEP'T OF INSURANCE, REDLINING: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE 1 (Oct. 1977).
3. B. Soldwisch, testimony presented before the Finance Committee of the City Council,
Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 12, 1978).
4. Insurance Bureau, Michigan Dep't of Commerce, Essential Insurance in Michigan: An
Avoidable Crisis 6 (Mar. 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Essential Insurance].
5. Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1, 31, 53, 61, 67 (1978) (testimonies of Barbara Pertz (Cleveland), Morton
Olshan (real estate investor), Grace Evans (St. Louis), and James McBride (Chicago)) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Rights and Remedies Hearings].
6. See Valukas & Bollow, supra note 2, at 20,
7. Insurance redlining, for purposes of this article, is defined as refusing, because of the
geographic area within which property is located, to insure or refusing to continue to insure, or
varying the amount or type of insurance coverage, or varying the terms or conditions under
which insurance coverage is available to homeowners or tenants.
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This article discusses insurance redlining within the fi'amework of* federal
antitrust and selected federal and state constitutional and statutory civil
rights laws that -afford an aggrieved person a cause of action. 8 State statutes
regulating insurance companies 9 are not reviewed except to the extent that
state regulatory law is germane to federal law. 10 Further, this article
examines the potential impact of state constitutions on redlining abuses. Par-
ticular emphasis is placed on the Illinois Constitution because of its unique
provision concerning the rights of "all persons" to buy and sell property, " a
provision that echoes federal civil rights law 12 and that must surely include
insurance. It should be noted that no civil rights statutes have been enacted,
at least in Illinois, that specifically prohibit racial discrimination in the sale of
property, including insurance.
THE PROBLEM
Insurance companies generally have responded to redlining complaints by
denying that they use factors associated with a geographic area, such as
neighborhood racial or ethnic composition, as determinants of insurabil-
ity. 13 Insurers typically have maintained that geographic redlining is
8. Administrative remedies with judicial review are available for redress of violations of the
Illinois Insurance Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1013-1019.2, 1028-1040 (1977).
9. See id. §§ 204.1-1153 (1977).
10. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, insurers are exempt from federal antitrust laws to
the extent they are regulated by state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976). See notes 50-53 and
accompanying text infra.
11. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17. This provision states:
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of
any employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these
rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.
Also, an insurance policy generally is itself personal property. 12 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 7007, 7016 (1968); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Tyco Indus., Inc., 500 F.2d
654 (3d Cir. 1974); Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 I11. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Old-
ham's Trustee v. Boston Ins. Co., 189 Ky. 844, 226 S.W. 106 (1920); In re Helpert's Estate, 300
N.Y.S. 886, 165 Misc. 430 (1938).
12, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in ever, State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
13. Rights and Remedies Hearings, supra note 5, at 200, 202 (testimony of Stephen I. Mor-
ton, Vice President, The Hartford Group). Martin stated that the automobile insurance industry
does not discriminate on basis of race, color, creed, national origin, or religion but rather uses a
rating system composed of objective criteria such as territory, place of garaging, age of driver,
sex, martial status, use of motor vehicle, driver education completion, age, make and model of
vehicle, and traffic violations. He further stated that the objective of such an underwriting
system is to limit loss, which the Hartford Group placed at $162.3 million over the period
1972-76 for personal automobile underwriting. Finally, since many legislative acts in the various
states (unspecified) inhibit underwriting practices, his company discourages new business in
those areas.
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merely a misperception of misinformed insurance consumers, and that
underwriting decisions are based strictly on objective, reliable, loss-related
rating classifications. 14 Such classifications, it is maintained, include the
factors of construction, occupancy, fire protection and exposure 15 but not,
for example, whether a neighborhood is racially changing or is principally
composed of ethnic minorities. 16
Nonetheless, geographic redlining by property insurers has been
documented by many investigators. Their reports reveal that insurers'
techniques have included: selectively placing agents only in certain areas;
formally or informally instructing agents to refuse to accept applications from
residents of certain neighborhoods; and varying underwriting standards and
requirements or selectively pricing property insurance according to geo-
graphic area. 17
Areas thai allegedly have been redlined are principally older urban
areas. 18 Occasionally, these areas are already in economic decline when the
apparent decision to redline is made. 19 In other cases, the areas are not yet
declining but instead represent racially or ethnically changing neighborhoods
or stable but principally minority areas. 20 The unavailability of essential
14. Allstate Insurance Company, for example, claims to have identified 12 Chicago postal
zones with adverse loss ratios in which it applies more stringent underwriting procedures and
six Chicago rating territories based upon loss experience. Valukas & Bollow, supra, note 2, at
59, 67; Address by L. Jordan, General Counsel, State Farm Insurance Company, Insurance
Redlining and Reinvestment: Directions for Change Conference (Chicago, Ill., Mar. 23, 1979).
15. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 189 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as PRICING AND MARKETING].
16. See Rights and Remedies Hearings, supra note 5, at 174-77 (statement of James R.
Faulstich, Vice President, Industry Relations, and C. Robert Hall, Vice President, National
Association of Independent Insurers). This was a joint statement in which they indicated that
the objective of risk classification is to reflect the degree of risk posed. Their remarks dealt with
real property insurance where the effect of inflation is that replacement cost far exceeds worth
in some areas and, consequently, insurers do not want to, and in many instances have stopped,
insuring in those areas. They stated that risk assessment should not be restricted. They also
noted that the insurance industry makes no moral judgments; it merely seeks to equate risk
with degree of loss and to make a profit.
17. See B. Malewski & M. Lampi, Where Do You Draw the Liune?-lnsurance Redlining in
New York (May, 1978) U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., INSURANCE CRISIS IN URBAN
AMERICA (May 24, 1978); [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE CRISIS]; G. KEENAN, INSURANCE
REDLINING: PROFITS VS. POLICYHOLDERS (2d ed. 1979); The Lakeview Citizens' Council,
Selective Placement of Homeowners Insurance Agents in Chicago-1967-1978 (1978); Public
Technology, Inc., Presentation to the D-2 Subcomm. Task Force on Redlining (Madison, Wis.,
Oct. 11, 1977).
18. Essential Insurance, supra note 4, at 5-7.
19. Rights and Remedies Hearings, supra note 5, at 98-99 (testimony of Richard D. Rod-
gers, Deputy Director, Consumer Division, Illinois Department of Insurance); C. Levin,
Homeowners' Insurance in Detroit: A Study of Redlining Practices and Discriminatory Rates
app. 12 (1976).
20. U.S. COMNI'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INSURANCE REDLINING: FACT NOT FICTION 10 (Feb.
1979) [hereinafter cited as INSURANCE REDLINING]; Note, Property Insurance and the American
1980]
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insurance to an area, of course, almost certainly guarantees that economic
decline will follow. 21 Furthermore, the impact of insurance redlining on
those least able to afford the consequences, those who for economic or other
reasons are restricted to certain neighborhoods, 22 is patently unfair and
economically destructive.
In a recent study of the availability of property insurance to risks located
in urban areas, in particular the availability to those risks located in urban
areas with large minority populations, the Midwestern State Advisory Com-
mittees to the United States Commission on Civil Rights (MSAC), focusing
on Chicago, analyzed the underwriting practices of insurers writing residen-
tial property insurance. 23 According to the report, Chicago was targeted
because it was the only Midwestern state in which the data essential to a
statistical analysis were available. Further, at the time of the study, only
Illinois had enacted legislation requiring property/casualty insurers to dis-
close routinely to the chief state regulatory officer the number of new
policies written, policies renewed, policies cancelled, and policies non-
renewed. 24 These data were available from the Illinois Department of In-
surance. 25 Thus, the study did not depend on obtaining the necessary data
from individual insurers.
Not only did the study analyze activity in the voluntary insurance market,
but it also looked at the involuntary or residual insurance market-the Fair
Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plan. 26 That plan was selected
Ghetto: A Study in Social Irresponsibility, 44 S. CAL. L. REV' 218, 229 (1971). The note sets
forth the proposition that the problem of availability of property insurance in the ghetto areas of
American cities (1) discriminates against ghetto owned and operated businesses, (2) contributes to
the overall physical decay of ghetto areas, (3) impedes the flow of new capital into ghetto areas
and (4) leads to a general unavailability of property insurance in the ghetto. Id. at 218-19.
The author includes empirical data which show that, contrary to the insurance industry's
claim that the unavailability of property insurance in the ghetto is the result of risk/loss experi-
ence, race is the real factor that insurance companies use to set rates and terms or to deny
insurance protection altogether. Id. at 233-36. This is, of course, in violation of the fourteenth
amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the antitrust laws. Id. at 219, 247-68.
The author also stated that the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plan, estab-
lished by 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3 to -10 (1976) is not an adequate remedy and that legislation to
bring the insurance industry in line with the law, is required. Id. at 237.
21. Essential Insurance, supra note 4, at 5-6.
22. J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A MICRO-
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1975); INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 8-9.
23. See INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20.
24. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.25 (1977); ILL. ADM. ORDER, Mar. 21, 1977 Insur-
ance Redlining, supra note 20, at 26, 46-50.
25. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 32.
26. The FAIR plan was established by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12
U.S.C., tit. XII §§ 1749bbb-3 to -10 (1976). The purpose of the Act was to ensure that essential
property insurance would continue to be available to prevent the abandonment of urban areas
by insurers and mortgagees. Only fire and extended coverage along with vandalism and mali-
cious mischief are mandated. 24 C.F.R. § 1905.3(a) (1979). Four states-Illinois, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin-offer full coverage through a homeowners' policy. Participating
insurers in states that create a FAIR plan in accord with the mininum requirements of federal
318 [Vol. 29:315
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for study as a measure of the past adverse underwriting decisions of insurers
that had forced insurance consumers into the involuntary, residual mar-
ket. 27 The decision to analyze FAIR plan data was based in part on a 1977
report prepared for the Illinois Department of Insurance. 28 That work indi-
cated that certain areas of Chicago and in some cases the entire city had
been written-off by insurers in the recent past. Thus, the availability of in-
surance through the voluntary market was limited. To study only current
underwriting activity in the voluntary market would not have revealed
whether certain areas of the city with older housing, lower incomes, and
higher minority compositions were continuing to suffer from these past ad-
verse underwriting practices. By looking at the FAIR plan, as well as the
voluntary market, the impact of past underwriting decisions as well as cur-
rent underwriting activity could be evaluated. Furthermore, at the time the
MSAC data were collected, coverage available in the Illinois FAIR plan,
limited to fire and extended coverage, 29 still was far less comprehensive
than property insurance available through the voluntary market. Thus, it was
reasonable to assume that- individuals would not voluntarily seek coverage in
the FAIR plan but rather would accept coverage under that plan only when
they had been unable to purchase insurance through the voluntary market or
had found such insurance priced beyond their reach.
Analysis of the data revealed that in the voluntary market and in the FAIR
plan, minority composition of the Zip code was the factor correlated most
highly with underwriting activity. 30 In the voluntary market, the lower the
minority composition of a Zip code, greater was the availability of insur-
ance. 3 1 In the FAIR plan, the opposite relationship prevailed; the higher
the minority composition of a Zip code, greater was the concentration of
FAIR plan policyholders. 32
Further, the data were analyzed to determine if, when differences in fire
and theft rates between Zip codes were held constant, minority composition
remained a significant predictor of underwriting activity. In both the volun-
law are eligible for federal riot reinsurance. Twenty-eight states have enacted a FAIR plan.
Insurance Crisis, supra note 17, at 6.
27. Telephone interview with R. Gossrow, Property and Casualty Actuary, Illinois Dep't of
Insurance (Oct. 2, 1978).
28. Valukas & Bollow, supra note 2, at 2.
29. Homeowners insurance did not become available tnder the Illinois FAIR plan until
August 1978. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.70 (Smith-Hurd) (West Supp. 1979).
30. In other words, minority composition was the single most important factor in explaining
underwriting activity. The correlation between minority composition (percent minority in popu-
lation) and voluntary market activity (new and renewed homeowners policies minus cancella-
tions and nonrenewals per 100 housing units) was -.78 (probability (p) < .001). The correlation
between minority composition and involuntary market activity (new and renewed FAIR plan
policies per 100 housing units) was + .72 (p < .001). INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at
35-36.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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tary and involuntary insurance markets, even with the effect of differences in
fire and theft eliminated, minority composition remained a significant predic-
tor of underwriting practices. .3 When the intercorrelation between minor-
ity composition and income was controlled, minority composition still was
found to be a significant predictor of underwriting activity in both the volun-
tary and involuntary property insurance markets. .4 Thus, the effect of
minority composition on underwriting activity was not solely the inadvertent
result of individual economic factors but rather was a significant predictor of
underwriting activity independent of income.
The MSAC report concluded that minority composition of an area is a
significant predictor of whether residential property located in that area will
be insured through the voluntary insurance market or whether the property
owner will be forced to seek coverage in the residual, involuntary mar-
ket. " The study stopped short of concluding that insurers intentionally use
either the minority status of the applicant or the neighborhood as a basis for
determining eligibility for property insurance. Thus, the report leaves un-
answered the crucial inquiry: have insurers deliberately refused to insure
residential property because of the minority status of the owner or
neighborhood or have insurers used racially and ethnically neutral under-
writing criteria that have had the effect of denying essential property insur-
ance to members of those racial and ethnic minorities? Because liability
under several of the laws to be discussed in the subsequent sections of this
article requires proof of intentional racial discrimination, the difference is
significant. 36 Appropriate private litigation appears justified, as the gross
33. The part correlation between minority composition and voluntary market activity after
removing the effects of fire and theft was -.36 (p < .05). The part correlation between minority
composition and involuntary market activity after removing the effects of fire and theft was -.41
(p < .01). Part correlations permit calculation of the relationship between a predictor variable
(e.g., minority composition) and a criterion variable (e.g., voluntary or involntary market activ-
ity) after eliminating the interrelationship between a predictor variable and another predictor
variable (e.g., minority composition with fire or theft). Second order part correlations in which
the interrelationship between minority composition and both fire and theft were eliminated
were calculated. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 36.
34. The correlation between minority composition and voluntary market activity after
eliminating the relationship between minority composition and income was -.39 (p < .01). The
correlation between minority composition and involuntarv market activity after eliminating the
relationship between minority composition and income was .34 (p < .05). INSURANCE REDLIN-
ING, supra note 20, at 36-37.
35. Id. at 60.
36. Both 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) clearly require anl element of intent
because both are based oil conspiratorial agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
[Vol. 29:315
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statistical disparities revealed by the MSAC study are sufficiently suggestive
of intentional policies and practices that, whether by design or effect, are
foreseeably racially discriminatory. 37
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
The business of insurance initially was considered to be a contractual con-
cern that involved only insurer and insured. 38  By the nineteenth century,
states had become actively involved in monitoring and regulating the prac-
tices of insurers in order to protect insureds from insolvent companies. 39 In
1914, the German Alliance Insurance Company challenged the right of the
Kansas Insurance Commissioner to- regulate and control rates and pre-
miums. 40 The company argued that the business of insurance was like any
other commercial enterprise. 41 The cost of insurance was, according to the
company, a matter to be determined solely by the parties to the transaction,
the insurer, and the insured. 42 The United States Supreme Court dis-
any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a
legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as
an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the
United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object
of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprive
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages oc-
casioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) renders the Sherman Act, not an antidiscrimination statute, applicable to
agreements to boycott and provides: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation."
37. The significant statistical disparities revealed by the INSURANCE REDLINING report,
supra note 20, should be sufficient to create a prima facie case of racial discrimination and thus
shift the burden to the defendant-insurers to prove that race was not even one reason among
many for adverse underwriting decisions in minority areas. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499
F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974) (prima facie inference that housing developer discriminated on
basis of race shifted burden to developer to explain practice). See also Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256-66 (1976) (discriminatory purpose, not merely a
racially disproportionate impact, must be shown to be a motivating factor in defendant's deci-
sion); Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 541 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1976) (private
school cannot deny admission to student if race is one of motivating factors behind denial);
Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970) (use of race as a factor
in rental decisions impermissible regardless of whether it was the sole or even one of a series of
motivating factors). See notes 110-115 and accompanying text infra.
38. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (insurance company incorporated
in one state is subject to regulation by other state in which company does business).
39. See id. at 168.
40. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
41. 1d. at 400.
42. Id.
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agreed with the company's arguments and indicated that the business of in-
surance has "a reach of influence and consequences beyond and different
from that of ordinary businesses in the commercial world." 43  Stressing the
unique importance of insurance to the public interest, the Court inferred
that the business of insurance must be regulated for the common good. 4
Therefore, liberty of contract was held not to preclude state regulation. 4
Subsequent to 1914, the insurance industry became subject to increasing
state regulation. Simultaneous federal regulation did not occur, however,
because insurance transactions were considered to be solely matters of in-
trastate commerce. 46 In 1944, a revolutionary decision by the Supreme
Court brought the federal government into the business of insurance for the
first time. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 4 a
case in which a number of insurance companies were found to have con-
spired to fix rates to drive other insurers out of business, the Court deter-
mined that insurance is interstate commerce subject to federal regulation,
including federal antitrust laws. 48 The Court implied that Congress might
exempt insurance from the antitrust laws, however, if it deemed such action
to be appropriate. .9 The following year, Congress, in response to South-
Eastern Underwriters, passed what is popularly known as the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. so Under that Act, insurance companies are exempt from
federal antitrust laws to the extent that they are regulated by state law. 1
43. Id. at 414.
44. Id. at 413.
45. Id.
46. H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1945] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 670, 670-71.
47. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Appellees, which consisted of over 200 fire insurance companies
and 27 individuals, were indicted for violation of the Sherman Act in that they conspired to fix
rates, monopolize trade, and used boycotts, force, and coercion to compel non-inember instir-
ance companies to becole members of their association in certain southeastern states. Id. at
534. Appellees' demurrer was sustained 1, the district court on the ground that the fire insur-
ance business did not constitute interstate commerce and was, therefore, exempt from federal
regulation. Id. at 536. The Supreme Court held: (1) the Sherman Act icas intended to apply to
fire insurance companies; and (2) the business of fire insurance did cross state lines so as to
bring it within the definition of interstate commerce. Id. at 553. The Court distinguished Paid
c. Virginia and subsequent cases relying on it because in those cases the Court was not con-
fronted with a situation where there was a federal statute passed by Congress and intended to
apply to fire insurance. Id. at 545. In the earlier cases, had the Coirt accepted the argument
that, because there was no applicable state law, the federal government and not the states
should regulate insurers, the insurers would have been virtually unregulated. The Court in
South-Eastern adopted the position that state and federal regulation of fire insurers was concur-
rent, with federal law applying to those aspects of the business that are interstate in character,
e.g.. conspiracies across lines in restraint of trade, Id. at 553.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 561.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1976).
51. id. § 1012 (1976) provides:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
[Vol. 29:315
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Whether regulated by state law or not, however, insurers are subject to
federal antitrust laws prohibiting boycotts, coercion, or intimidation. 52 Thus,
even if state law prohibits an insurer from engaging in a boycott, such con-
duct also is actionable at the federal level under the Sherman Act. 53
Historically, the proscription against boycotts, coercion, or intimidation in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act generally had been interpreted to protect insur-
ers from the actions of other insurers; 54 individual policyholders and appli-
cants for insurance were beyond the scope of the Act. In the spring of 1978,
however, the Supreme Court was confronted with St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Barry, 55 in which an individual applicant for medical mal-
practice insurance, denied insurance by several companies, alleged that the
denials constituted a boycott. 56 The insurers argued that the prohibition
against boycotts, coercion, and intimidation protected only other insurers
and did not provide a cause of action for individuals. 57  The Court dis-
agreed. In a seven to two decision, the Court held that the concerted refusal
of insurers to deal with individuals constituted a boycott prohibited under
the Sherman Act. 58 The Court was careful to qualify its decision, however,
by indicating, on the one hand, that conduct by a single actor cannot consti-
tute a boycott and, on the other hand, that not all concerted activity be-
tween insurers violates the Sherman Act. 59 How far the Court intends to
extend the reach of the Sherman Act to insurance company practices awaits
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede an%
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, That 'after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2,
1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as
amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended [15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.], shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State law.
52. Id. § 1013(b). For text of § 1013(b), see note 36 supra.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
54. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 536 n.5 (1978).
55. 438 U.S. 531 (1978). Respondents, licensed physicians, sued, on a class action basis, four
Rhode Island insurance companies, alleging that three of the companies refused to deal with
them as a means of compelling the doctors to deal with the fourth on terms unfavorable to
them. id. at 533. The district court dismissed the complaint, which alleged Sherman Act viola-
tions, on the ground that the antitrust claim was barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id.
The court of appeals reversed, id. at 534, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated
that the provision of the Sherman Act that prohibits boycotts, coercion, or intimidation was
applicable unless specifically exempted and the McCarran-Ferguson Act provided no such
exemption. 1d. at 550-51. The Court found that the type of conduct alleged by respondents
constituted a boycott under the Sherman Act. Id. at 552-55.
56. Id. at 535.
57. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 552-55.
59. Id. at 555. In regard to the agency relationship between agents and insurers, see notes
105 and 125 infra.
1980]
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future litigation. Nonetheless, the Barry decision represents a significant
shift in traditional interpretation; at least some joint action by insurers that
denies insurance coverage to individual applicants is now violative of the
Sherman Act.
Does insurance redlining constitute a violation of the Sherman Act under
the Barry rationale? It is clear that a decision by a single insurer or agent to
redline an area or deny insurance to a single applicant does not constitute a
violation of the Act. If two insurers agree to decline insurance applications or
limit the amount or type of coverage available to applicants in a specific
geographic area, however, such agreements probably would violate the Act
as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. A more likely situation to
trigger insurer liability would arise when an insurer and an independent
agent or broker agree to avoid a given geographic area. In fact, many com-
plaints have been registered addressing the refusal of Chicago agents, on
instructions from the company, to attempt to place insurance with a particu-
lar company because it no longer writes in a given neighborhood. 60 If these
agreements between insurer and independent agent are tantamount to a
concerted "refusal to deal" arrangement, they are prohibited by the Sher-
man Act. 61
In Barry, however, the Court indicated that its boycott discussion did not
apply to concerted activity between insurers, or between insurers and others,
that is "compelled or specifically authorized by state regulatory policy." 62 In
recognizing the legitimacy of such state action, the Court followed the
rationale set forth in Parker v. Brown. 63 In that case, the Court held that
anticompetitive conduct becomes insulated from antitrust laws, even where
competition is displaced by regulation or monopoly, when the conduct oc-
curs as a result of state action. 64 For purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, federal courts repeatedly have held that the state's power to control
rates constitutes such insulating state action under the prevailing Parker doc-
trine. The power to regulate rates both directly and indirectly through ad-
versary proceedings provides this antitrust insulation. 65 For example,
under the Parker doctrine an agreement between an insurer and indepen-
dent agent or between two insurers to accept only preferred risks or to limit
coverage to repair cost would be exempt from federal antitrust laws when
the insurer has filed those policies with the chief insurance regulatory officer
and received necessary authorization.
60. See Valukas & Bollow, supra note 2, at 12-23.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
62. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 555 (1978).
63. 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943) (state agricultural marketing program that operated to re-
strict competition and to regulate sale and distribution of agricultural commodities held not
within the scope of, and thus not a violation of, the Sherman Act).
64. Id. at 350-52.
65. ILLINOIS DEP'T OF INSURANCE, INSURANCE REGULATION AND ANTITRUST: THE EFFECT
OF THE REPEAL OF THE MCCARAN-FERGUSON ACT 12-13 (1979).
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Parker leaves open the question whether state action would insulate an
insurer if it were alleged that the chief regulatory officer was a joint par-
ticipant with the insurer in a "concerted refusal to deal," i.e., a boycott,
rather than exercising his or her proper governmental function. If the state
is not carrying out a legitimate governmental function but instead is a culpa-
ble joint participant, the insurer could be stripped of its exemption from
antitrust law. 66 The congressional intent behind the Sherman Act should
determine whether the state itself would be liable in such a situation. The
legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress did not intend that
law to apply to such acts by a state. 67
The allegation often is made that there is a revolving door between the
insurance industry and the office of the chief state insurance regulatory of-
ficer. 68 The implication, of course, is that the latter's decisions are made in
the self-interest of the officer and insurer, not in the public interest. The
Parker doctrine is premised on the state's exercising a proper governmental
role. 69 Thus, if a regulatory officer's decision could be shown to exceed the
bounds of his or her statutory authority, and to be in his or her limited
pecuniary or other interest or that of an insurer, such misuse of discretion
could be sufficient to remove the shield of antitrust protection, at least from
the insurer. 70 Such a situation might exist where it could be proved that
the chief regulatory officer agreed with an insurer's decision to remove its
business from a geographic area in return for a promise of future employ-
ment. Problems of proof, of course, abound. Nonetheless, those problems
should not obscure the potential for liability when the regulatory officer
permits an insurer to withdraw its business totally or permits the insurer to
withdraw more desirable or comprehensive forms of coverage from an urban
community.
Because a boycott requires an agreement between at least two parties, the
applicability of the Sherman Act to decisions of the state regulatory officer
will be crucial when the challenged activity is an agreement between a
single insurer and the regulatory officer. It is not necessary, however, to
66. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra.
67. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2459, 2461, 2562 (1889). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 351 (1943) (legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend to include states within
reach of the Sherman Act); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493-95 n.15 (1940)
(Sherman Act covers only business combinations).
68. Address by Eleanor Lewis, Ass't Insurance Commissioner, New Jersey, Discrimination
Against Minorities and Women in Pensions and Health, Life and Disability Insurance Consulta-
tion, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights (Wash., D.C., April 26, 1978).
69. 317 U.S. at 351-52 (reliance on state as sovereign entity).
70. Whether the chief regulatory officer will enjoy sovereign immunity from personal liabil-
ity for acts not entered into in good faith or for acts not representing a proper governmental
function is beyond the scope of this article. The Supreme Court, however, in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974), determined that government officers are entitled only to a
qualified immunity, not an absolute immunity for discretionary acts. Further, the Court recently
upheld Scheuer in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (executive officials charged with
constitutional violations enjoy a qualified immunity, although there are some officials whose
special functions require absolute immunity).
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prove a racial or ethnic basis for the agreement. 71 Thus, the hurdle of
proving intentionality or foreseeability of racially adverse consequences is
eliminated under this statutory vehicle.
The Impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
Upon Access to the Courts for Civil Rights Violations
Alternative state and federal courts were not always available to individu-
als aggrieved by racial or ethnic discrimination. Prior to the Civil War, Con-
gress relied solely on the states to vindicate individual rights to personal
security. 72 When the Civil Rights Acts were enacted following that war, 73
Congress altered its established policy and placed primary responsibility for
protecting individual civil rights on the federal level. Thus, until enactment
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945,74 there would have been no ques-
tion that federal courts were open to complaints of civil rights violations in
regard to insurance.
Since 1945, however, the McCarran-Ferguson Act has exempted the busi-
ness of insurance from federal law to the extent that state law regulates the
subject. 75 The Act, however, does not define the "business of insurance."
Recently, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,76 the Su-
preme Court distinguished between the "business of insurance," which is
exempt under the Act, and the "business of insurance companies," which
lies within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. The "business of insur-
ance," according to the Court, refers to the essence of insurance itself, that
is, the spreading and distribution of risk. 77 Ultimately, this function is man-
ifest in the contract between insurer and insured. Thus, the "business of
insurance" is only that part of the insurer's activities that is related to risk
assessment and marketing. Clearly, basic underwriting decisions represent
the "business of insurance."
71. The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not distinguish between a boycott grounded in com-
mercial as against racial or other invidious discrimination. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976). For
the text of § 1013(), see note 36 supra.
72. T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1375-76 (3d ed. 1967). Prior to the enactment of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth amendments, individual civil rights were virtually the exclusive concern of state law.
Since 1833, the Bill of Rights had been held to constrain the federal government but not state,
municipal, or private conduct. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 248 (1833).
Furthermore, blacks were not considered "persons" entitled to such federal constitutional pro-
tections as did exist until the passage of the Civil Rights Acts. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 404 (1856).
73. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the
statutes passed to enforce them form the core of federal protection against racial and ethnic
discrimination in the public (state and municipal) and private spheres. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983,
1985 (1976). See notes 96-125 and accompanying text infra.
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
75. Id, § 1012 (unless a federal law relates specifically to business of insurance).
76. St, Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
77. Id. at 551. The Court did not define the "business of insurance companies."
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Further, it would seem, on the basis of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, that
even if individuals are denied insurance because of their race or ethnicity,
they will be denied redress in the federal courts because (1) the "business of
insurance" is reserved to state regulation, 7 and, (2) virtually all states forbid
by statute or regulation unfair discrimination in the issuance or termination
of insurance. 79 The McCarran-Ferguson Act cannot deprive individuals of
their rights to complain to the federal courts that their federally guaranteed
rights in regard to insurance have been violated. Access to the federal courts
is available even where state law provides a remedy for the very acts upon
which the civil rights violation is grounded. 80 Thus, an insurer's decision
not to insure an individual because of his or her race or national origin or
that of neighbors, while constituting an underwriting decision-part of the
"business of insurance," remains subject to federal civil rights laws.
Moreover, were the McCarran-Ferguson Act to be interpreted as depriv-
ing an individual of a federal forum, the Act would represent a unique with-
drawal of protection in favor of a single industry. There is nothing in the
legislative history of the Act to indicate that Congress intended such a re-
sult. 81 In addition, the Civil Rights Acts of the nineteenth century created
new federal civil rights. 82 Because Congress does not create hypothetical
rights or substantive rights with hypothetical remedies, it is unlikely that
Congress would have enacted these civil rights statutes without ensuring
continuing federal remedies for their violation. 83
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976). For the text of § 1012, see note 51 supra.
79. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1031(3) (1977) provides:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance:
(3) Making or permitting, in the case of insurance of the types enumerated in
Classes 2 and 3 of Section 4, any unfair discrimination between individuals or risks
of the same class or of essentially the same hazard and expense element because of
the race, color, religion or national origin of such insurance risks or applicants.
[citation omitted].
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2027(a)(i) (1977); Wis. STAT. § 625.12(2) (1977); PRICING AND
MARKETING, supra note 15, at 331.
80. Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (D. Colo. 1974)
(action for redress of alleged civil rights violation arising out of purchase of required casualty
insurance for new automobile). See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (where first amend-
ment rights involved, the delay of a state court proceeding may result in impermissible chilling
of constitutional right sought to be protected); MeNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963)
(prior resort to state proceeding not required in a federal action under the Civil Rights Acts).
81. H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945), reprinted in [1945] U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV. 670, 672. This report indicates that the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is
to permit the continued regulation and taxation of insurers by the states. The authority of the
states to regulate and tax had been drawn into question by the South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n case. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
82. Of the rights that were created, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 are particularly germane to this
discussion. For text of § 1981, see note 87 infra. For text of § 1982, see note 12 supra.
83. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979) (private right of action
maintainable for alleged sex discrimination in medical school admission under Title IX although
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act should be interpreted to exempt only the
"business of insurance" qua "business of insurance" from federal law. Those
aspects of such business that represent civil rights violations should remain
subject to federal scrutiny. Such an interpretation permits the Act and rele-
vant civil rights law to exist in harmony while each retains its distinct pur-
pose and authority.
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Those engaging in insurance redlining could be found liable under the
several federal civil rights laws. The thirteenth amendment states: "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."8 4  The Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1870, 8 and a portion of the Act of 1871, 8 were passed to enforce
the provisions of the thirteenth amendment and thereby to provide a
number of fundamental protections of individual rights. Under section 1981,
"all persons" are guaranteed equal rights to make and enforce contracts. 87
Under section 1982, "'all persons" possess equal rights to buy and sell real
and personal property. 88 Finally, under section 1985, "all persons" are pro-
tected by federal law from conspiracies to interfere with their civil rights. 89
that Act provides only an administrative remedy); j.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(stockholders' action for redress of corporation's alleged violation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 maintainable although the Act provided no private cause of action); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (class action brought by mobility-disabled persons
who were unable to use public transportation system established a private cause of action to
vindicate rights).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
85. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)); Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)).
86. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976)).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). For the text of § 1982, see note 12 supra.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(a)-(b) (1976) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or
place of confidence under the United States or from discharging any duties thereof;
or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State,
district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to
injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties
of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his
property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duties;
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These statutes provide the causes of action through which a private citizen
may seek redress for a violation of protected rights in the federal courts. 90
The persons to whom the protections extend, however, are limited to mem-
bers of racial minorities. Unlike section 1983,91 these statutes enacted under
the thirteenth amendment have been construed to retain their essential ini-
tial purpose to protect blacks from invidious discrimination. 92 Where a
classification based on membership in an ethnic minority, such as Mexican
or Hispanic, is tantamount to classification on the basis of race, the courts
have expanded the ambit of these laws to include members of such ethnic
groups. 93
Unlike section 1983, which was promulgated to enforce the commands of
the fourteenth amendment, the foregoing civil rights statutes enacted under
(b) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness or juror
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or from testifying to an, matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on
account of his having so attending or testified, or to influence the verdict, present-
ment, or indictment or an' grand or petit juror in an), such court, or to injure such
juror in his person or propert' on account of any verdict, presentment, or indict-
ment lawfully assented to b) him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if
two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing,
or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory,
with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him
or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any
person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), stating the sanction for violations of subsections (a) and (b),
see note 36 supra.
90. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(1), (2), & (4) provide the jurisdictional bses for these actions.
91. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
While the fourteenth amendment was originally enacted to protect blacks, by 1866 the equal
protection clause was being applied not only to other racial groups but also to such economic
institutions as corporations. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065 (1969).
92. Only racial or quasi-racial discrimination lies within the purview of these civil rights laws
based on the thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (pri-
vate school may not discriminate in admissions on basis of race); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (employer may not discriminate with respect to seniority rules
and job assignments on basis of race); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
(object of thirteenth amendment to free blacks from slavery and not to impede the states in the
proper exercise of their police power).
93. See, e.g., Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. II1, 1977) (persons of
Hispanic origin have standing to bring an action alleging racial discrimination in the sale of
installment credit property insurance).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:315
the thirteenth amendment are applicable to the conduct of private per-
sons. 94 Thus, an individual acting solely on his or her private capacity is
potentially liable under sections 1981, 1982, and 1985. Consequently, the
conduct of private insurance companies, agents, and brokers is cognizable
under these statutes. 9
Section 1981
Section 1981 forbids private persons from refusing to enter into contracts
with individuals because of their race. Insurance contracts have been held to
be contract within the purview of section 1981.96 Thus, under that section,
a member of a racial minority may not be denied insurance, that is, a con-
tract of insurance, or offered only limited insurance coverage, because of his
or her race. In addition, because section 1981 protects both members or
racial minorities and whites from discrimination against the former, 97 a
white who is denied insurance because of the minority composition of his or
her neighborhood also has a cause of action.
The coverage provided under an insurance contract varies according to the
type of policy. A homeowners policy, for example, may cover all perils or it
may exclude certain perils such as the collapse of a building due to the
weight of snow. 98 A fire policy only on building and contents severely
limits coverage by excluding theft, vandalism, and malicious mischief. 99
94. Section 1983 requires state action and is not appropriate where the defendant is a
private citizen. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). Under §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985,
however, the conduct of private citizens is actionable and state action is not required. Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 168; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (action by Negro citizens against white citizens
alleging conspiracy, through force and violence, to deprive them of their constitutional rights to
speech, assembly, association, and movement); Jones v. Alfred H Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (action by Negro citizen alleging racial discrimination in the private sale of real estate);
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974)
(action by blacks alleging discriminatory pricing and terms between black and white citizens in
the sale of private housing).
95. Section 1983 requires a threshold finding of "state action" in the challenged conduct.
Sections 1981, 1982, and 1985 do not demand that the defendant have acted under color of state
law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985(b) (1976).
96. Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass.
1972) (action by blacks alleging racial discrimination in rejection of their applications for accident
insurance).
97. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (white employees brought
action alleging racial discrimination in that they were discharged for misappropriating goods but
a Negro employee, charged with the same offense, was not discharged); Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (preference rights to use of recreational facilities within
a designated geographic area may not be denied a resident of that area on the basis of race);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (transferability of a membership share
in a private recreational facility may not be impeded on account of race where such share is an
integral part of a real property lease or sale).
98. G. STEVENSON, FIRE INSURANCE: ITS NATURE AND DYNAMICS 16 (1978).
99. Id. at 13.
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Also, some personal lines, and property/casualty insurance policies offer
coverage only to the cost of repair rather than full replacement cost. 100 To
the extent that any of these limitations are imposed on an applicant for racial
reasons, they, along with the outright refusal to insure, are prohibited by
section 1981.
Further, exclusive or "captive" agents are employees of a particular insur-
ance company. 101 If such an agent refuses to accept an application for in-
surance because of the applicant's race, the agent subjects both the agent
and the principal company to potential liability under section 1981. In such a
case, the act of the agent is the act of the principal. 102 Many companies
operate through independent agents who are not employees of the company
but instead have contractual arrangements with a number of companies for
placing insurance. 103 Their function is to accept (or reject) applications for
insurance and decide which of a number of insurers with whom they have a
contractual arrangement will best serve the client's insurance needs. An in-
surance broker is even more removed from the insurer. He or she operates
without a contract and merely places applications for insurance with one or
another insurer.
An independent agent or broker is, however, no less than the exclusive
agent an integral part of the sequence of events culminating in an insurance
contract. An application for insurance constitutes an offer. 104 If a broker or
independent agent refuses to accept an application for insurance, he or she
effectively interferes with contract formation. If the refusal to accept the
application is based on race, such refusal would be actionable under section
1981.
With the independent agents and brokers, however, the question of the
liability of the insurer itself is not as straightforward as it is with exclusive
100. Repair cost policies are being developed particularly for dwellings where replacement
cost exceeds market value of the property by 150%, although there are certain limitations. For
example, to determine the policy coverage, the market value of the property is reduced by 20%
to account for land value. After this reduction, the remaining market value of the dwelling is
increased by 150%, thereby reflecting the actual maximum replacement cost covered by
the policy. A policyholder, however, should be aware that the actual replacement cost of the
dwelling may exceed the coverage of the policy. This anomaly can occur if the product of the
dwelling's square footage and the replacement cost per square foot (current replacement costs
are $40 to $45 per square foot) exceeds the maximum policy coverage using the 150% formula.
Allstate Insurance Company pioneered the development of this type of coverage. Conversation
with Joseph Bellissimo, Senior Account Agent, Allstate Insurance Company (March 17, 1980).
101. State Farm Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, and Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company conduct their business through exclusive agents.
102. Oridinary agency principles apply to the exclusive agent-company relationship. Thus, an
agent acting in the scope of his or her employment subjects the principal, in this case the
employing insurer, to liability under the well-established doctrine of respondeat superior. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 216, 219(1) (1958).
103. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany both utilize independent agents.
104. R. RIEGEL, J. MILLER, & C. WILLIAMS, JR., INSURANCE PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 36
(6th ed. 1976).
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agents. Nonetheless, independent agents are agents of the insurer and sub-
ject it to liability to the same extent as do exclusive agents. 105 With bro-
kers, however, it would probably be necessary to find that the racial dis-
crimination underlying the denial of insurance occurred as the direct result
of insurer authorization, In that case, the insurer would be liable directly for
its express refusal to accept offers from applicants because of the applicant's
race. In appropriate circumstances, the link between insurer and broker
should not be difficult to find. There has been considerable testimony, for
example, that some insurers have instructed brokers and agents not to ac-
cept insurance applications on property located in certain areas of the
city. 106 As discussed in the first section of this article, certain areas within
Chicago are readily identifiable as areas with high and low minority composi-
tions. Also, the MSAC study reported that residents of high minority areas
are far less likely to find property insurance available in the voluntary mar-
ket than residents of predominantly white areas. 107 Thus, to the extent that
geographic area is a subterfuge for race, the refusal to accept the application
for insurance because of area of residence would be prohibited under section
1981. 108
The question of the potential liability of insurers operating through agents
and brokers may turn on findings that insurers instructed the brokers to
restrict their activity in certain areas and that such restriction was racially
motivated. As to the latter determination, the statistical disparities in volun-
tary and involuntary market activity in the white and minority Zip codes
reported by the MSAC study 0 9 should be suffcient to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. 110 The burden then would shift to the insurer
105. Independent agents and brokers for insurance purposes are considered agents of the
insurer. 16 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8672, at 137-38 (1968). Agency
principles hold that a principal is liable for the consequences of an agent's conduct resulting
from the former's direction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1958). But see discus-
sion, note 125 infra.
106. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 6.
107. Id. at 8.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects both whites and blacks from the consequences of racial dis-
crimination against blacks. Therefore, white residents of areas with large minority populations
are protected against discrimination in the sale of insurance where such discrimination is based
on the minority composition of the area. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 295 (1976);, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); Clark v. Universal
Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 331-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Winston v.
Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977).
109. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 9.
110. Disparate impact has been sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion in several areas. See, e.g., the discussions in regard to Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) and in regard to Title VI in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568
(1974).
Two federal appellate courts have adopted the discriminatory effect standard for plaintiff cases
arising under Title VIII. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). In Arlington Heights, the
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to prove that some loss-related factor, e.g., arson rates or a ratio of replace-
ment value to market value above 150%, 111 and not race, was the basis for
its action.
Support for the finding of a prima facie case is found in Clark v. Universal
Builders and Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co. 112 In both of those cases, the
defendants were exploiting the consequences of racially segregated
neighborhoods. In Clark, the Seventh Circuit decision which became the
basis of Ortega, the court stated that a prima facie case was established upon
showing that prior racial segregation created a dual housing market and that
defendants had taken advantage of that market by demanding prices and
terms for blacks in excess of what was being required of whites. 113 Having
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a Title VIII violation may be proved by
showing a disproportionate effect on minorities of a government housing policy. 558 F.2d at
1289. The Arlington Heights court reasoned that the result of the defendant's action in refusing
to zone for low- and middle-income housing in a virtually all-white area, regardless of its motive,
would be to discriminate upon the basis of race. Id. This result frustrated the national goal of
integrated housing, and thus it perpetuated segregation. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also adopted the discriminatory effect standard for
the prima facie case in the Rizzo decision. The Rizzo court held that the Philadelphia Housing
Authority and the Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia violated Title VIII because their
actions, in converting an integrated area into an all-white area, had a discriminatory effect on
minorities by denying them housing on the basis of race. 564 F.2d at 149-50. Rizzo and Ar-
lington Heights demonstrate that the discriminatory effect standard is appropriate under Title
VIII and that the prima facie case is a powerful evidentiary weapon in situations where the
defendant has all the information and the plaintiff lacks access to the information, which is the
case in insurance redlining.
In addition, statistics often have been used with judicial approval to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339, (1977) (employment discrimination); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970) (jury
selection). Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari only to dismiss subsequently for
mootness a case that would have decided whether § 1981 requires strict proof of intent to
discriminate or whether proof of disparate impact will suffice to establish liability. The court of
appeals had held that Title VII and § 1981 standards with regard to proof of racial discrimination
are the same; both require proof of disparate impact only. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566
F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 437 U.S. 903 (1978), vacated as moot, 99 S. Ct. 1379
(1979) (action by black and Mexican-American fire department applicants alleging discrimination
in hiring by use of a height requirement not shown to be job related. Furthermore, race need
not be shown to be the sole or even the primary factor underlying a refusal to issue a contract
(in this case of insurance) to establish liability under § 1981. The use of race even as one among
many other factors is impermissible. See note 37 supra. For an excellent discussion of the prima
facie case, see Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 199 (1978); Comment, Applying the Title VII Prinia Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11
H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 157 (1976).
111. The "business necessity" defense is discussed at note 207 infra.
112. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d at 334; Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F.
Supp. at 140. See notes 93-94 supra.
113. 501 F.2d at 334. See note 94 supra. The court appears to have assumed that the racial
segregation underlying the dual housing market occurred as a result of intent rather than sheer
happenstance. However, the Clark defendants did not themselves create the segregated resi-
dential pattern but merely used that pattern to their own pecuniary advantage.
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established those two factors, the burden of persuasion then shifted to the
defendants to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their
conduct.
With insurance redlining, it seems reasonable to suggest that a prima facie
case is established upon a showing that geographic areas have a dispropor-
tionate concentration of minority residents caused by prior racial segrega-
tion 114 and that insurers are restricting their general business in predomi-
nantly black areas, are charging excessive premiums, are requiring special
terms and conditions, are limiting the extent of individual coverage, or are
engaging in other discriminatory conduct.
Section 1982
A contract of insurance also creates a property right. A contract of prop-
erty insurance is a chose in action and is in itself a personal property right
distinct from the building or contents that are insured. 115 The property
right thus created is protected under section 1982. 116 An insurer's refusal
to issue property insurance for reasons of race would unlawfully deny an
individual the right to purchase personal property and thus would be action-
able under section 1982.
Further, the historical relationship between section 1981 and section 1982
suggests that the two sections reasonably may be similarly construed. 117 To
reiterate a similar discussion of section 1981 earlier, the data analyzed by the
MSAC report revealed that residents of high minority communities had been
denied insurance for reasons either based directly on race or associated with
race. 118 Thus, it seems likely that the statistical disparities set forth in the
study would sustain a prima facie case of racial discimination under section
1982 where an applicant has been denied an insurance contract and alleges a
racial basis for the denial. 119
Section 1985(c)
Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies between private persons to deprive a
member of a racial minority of his or her civil rights. 120 The right of con-
114. The MSAC study merely confirmed what has been demonstrated in all large northern
urban-suburban areas. Segregated housing patterns are the norm. See, e.g., G. ORFIELD, MUST
WE Bus? 77-85 (1978). The author discusses the development of urban racial ghettos and
affirmative government support of segregated housing patterns.
115. 12 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7016 (1968).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). For the text of § 1982, see note 12 supra.
117. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. at 440. Thus, whites along with
members of racial minorities are protected from racial discrimination.
118. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 29-30.
119. Id. at 30-32.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). For the text of § 1985, see notes 89 and 36 supra. The specific
language of the statute mandates "equal privileges and immunities tinder the laws." In Griffin
v. Breckenridge, the Supreme Court indicated that "[tihe conspiracy . . . must aim at a depriva-
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tract and the right to purchase property are both protected civil rights. 121
Therefore, this section prohibits agreements between insurers or with others
to deny insurance on account of race.
Insurers customarily meet to discuss insurance practices only under the
direction of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) or
under the direction of their individual state insurance commissioners. 122
This policy is not in response to section 1985 but rather to avoid liability
under that part of the Sherman Act from which insurers are not exempt
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 123 Nonetheless, insurers are careful to
avoid even the perception that they act in concert without state authoriza-
tion.
As stated earlier, insurers regularly conduct their affairs through agents
and brokers. Independent agents and brokers are not employees of a particu-
lar insurer while exclusive agents are. An insurer who agrees with an exclu-
sive agent to refuse insurance to individuals for racial reasons cannot be held
liable for a conspiracy because one cannot conspire with oneself. 124 An in-
dependent agent or broker, however, legally may be capable of participating
in a conspiracy with an insurer where both agree to refuse insurance because
of the race of the applicant. 125 Such agreements are precisely what is pro-
hibited by section 1985.
In line with earlier discussions, the MSAC report 126 indicates that racial
factors may be contributing significantly to the unavailability of insurance in
the voluntary market. To the extent that insurers have agreed with indepen-
dent agents or brokers or with each other to restrict insurance availability in
areas with large minority population through the voluntary market, those
agreements are unlawful under section 1985.
tion of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis
added).
121. Because all persons have an equal right to buy property (§ 1982) and make contracts
(§ 1981) and these are federally protected rights, a conspiracy to deprive an individual of these
rights for reason of race constitutes an offense under § 1985.
122. The NAIC was founded in 1871. It is composed of the chief insurance regulatory officers
of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The organization
meets twice a year to discuss matters of common interest including proposed legislation. The
purposes of the NAIC include promoting uniformity in insurance law and regulation and pre-
serving "to the several states the regulation of the business of insurance." NAIC CONST. art. 2.
123. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
124. Section 1985 embodies the well-established principle that a conspiracy requires at least
two persons: "If two or more persons .... For the text of § 1985, see notes 89 and 36 supra.
See United States v. Santa Rita Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 9-10, 113 P. 620, 621 (1911), for an early
discussion of agency issues in prosecutions for conspiracies in violation of federal antitrust laws.
125. See note 105 supra. However, the insurance agent is considered an agent of the insurer
to protect the applicant. That is, because the insurance agent is the agent of the insurer as
opposed to the agent of the applicant, the latter is able to rely on the agent's representations in
regard to the insurer. For purposes of § 1985, however, it would be reasonable to consider the
insurance agent an independent contractor acting as agent of the applicant instead of insurer in
order to carry out the underlying purpose of the principles relevant here, i.e., protection of the
applicant.
126. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 60.
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Title VIII
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 also was promulgated under the authority of
the thirteenth amendment. 127 In addition to prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in the sale and rental of housing or in associated services, the Act pro-
hibits such discrimination based upon other factors, including national ori-
gin. 128 The Act also expressly prohibits discrimination in the issuance of
real estate and home improvement loans, but does not expressly protect
insurance transactions. Insurance is a prerequisite to obtaining a mortgage,
however, and no mortgagee would be willing to lend money to a potential
home buy'er without having his or her interest in the property protected. 129
Further, some financial companies maintain subsidiary property/casualty
insurance businesses. 130 It undoubtedly would be unlawful for a financial
company to deny an application for a real estate loan because of the appli-
cant's failure to obtain insurance after the subsidiary had denied that insur-
ance based on racial or ethnic considerations. Most insurers, however, are
not directly affiliated with lending institutions and are not operating under
express agreement with such institutions. In this case, denying an applica-
tion for a real estate loan because the applicant could not obtain insurance is
probably an activity too indirect to be reached by the present Act.
127. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). The Fair Housing Act was enacted as
Title Vill of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-254, 82 Stat. 81.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976) provides:
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by see-
tions 3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwell-
ing to an' person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates any, preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limita-
tion, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such
dwelling is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the
neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
129. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT'S NAT'L ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED
AREAS, MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES 1 (1968).
130. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, Illinois, is one such company
that maintains a subsidiary property insurance business through the Talman Services Corpora-
tion General Insurance Division.
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The more important question, however, is whether the Fair Housing Act
as it now stands is broad enough to reach the practices of insurers them-
selves by prohibiting insurance redlining based on the minority composition
of the neighborhood or minority status of the insurance applicant. Sections
3 604(a), 3604(b), and 3617 of the Act 1 3 ' do not refer to insurance at all but
rather limit their prohibitions to certain discriminatory acts that make dwell-
ings "unavailable," to discrimination in the provision of "services and
facilities" in connection with the sale or rental of dwellings, or to interfer-
ences with rights protected under, inter alia, section 3604. 132
Insurance could be considered beyond the scope of the present Act for
two reasons. First, the denial of insurance in the voluntary market does not
make dwellings as such unavailable. Such redlining may render mortgages
unavailable, although in twenty-eight states essential property insurance is
available to all objectively insurable risks through the FAIR plan. 133 In
fact, the FAIR plan was enacted independently of the Fair Housing Act to
ensure that mortgages would not become unavailable to inner city residents
because of their inability to secure essential property insurance. 134 Denial
of residential property insurance through the voluntary market in these
states does not render even mortgages unavailable. 135 Secondly, insurance
is not a "service or facility" in connection with the sale or rental of the
dwelling. 136 Furthermore, the sketchy legislative history of the Act is too
inadequate to sustain a clear determination that Congress intended to reach
such independent ancillary services as insurances. 13
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), (b), 3617 (1976). Section 3617 provides:
Interference, coercion, or intimidation; enforcement by civil action
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person
in the exercise of enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or
on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected bv section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606
of this title. This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.
132. Id.
133. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb-3 to -10 (1976). The FAIR plan was established by Title XII of
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. Id. See note 26 supra.
134. INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 17, at 4-5.
135. In a recent case, however, a federal district court held that denial of insurance for racial
reasons constituted a violation of § 3604(a) by making housing unavailable. Having determined a
claim under § 3604(a), the court declined to reach the issue of services under § 3604(b). Dunn
v. Midwestern Inden. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). Prohibited practices include, inter alia, real estate appraisal,
steering, denial of multiple listing services, discriminatory application procedures, refusal of
representation by a real estate broker, and imposing disparate appraisal values. Id.
137. See Prosposed Amendments to the Fair Housing Act: Hearings on H.R. 3504 and H.R.
7787 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1978) (statement of Drew S. Days III)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Amendments]; Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and
a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
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Nonetheless, by administrative decision 138 and by developing case law, 139
it is being determined that the Fair Housing Act is indeed broad enough to
bring insurance companies within its ambit. Whether these decisions will be
supported by higher courts remains unresolved. Assuming that the Fair
Housing Act as it is presently written does prohibit insurance redlining
based upon racial factors, the same section 1981 arguments would apply to
ban discrimination against whites as well as racial and ethnic minorities who
live in a particular area. 140
Furthermore, it would not be necessary to demonstrate that race was the
only factor underlying the denial of insurance. Rather, it would be sufficient
to establish liability if race, an impermissible factor under Title VIII, was
shown to be merely one factor underlying the denial of insurance. 141 Such
proof that race was a basis for denying insurance, would, of course, satisfy
any intent requirement imposed upon Title VIII.
With regard to the question of intent, the Seventh Circuit, on the remand
of the Arlington Heights case, indicated that "at least under some cir-
cumstances a violation of section 3604(a) can be established by a showing of
discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory intent."1 4 2  These
circumstances would seem to include conduct whose "natural, probable and
foreseeable" consequences result in racial discrimination. 143 Thus, (assum-
ing that the present Fair Housing Act does reach insurance company prac-
tices) an insurance company that redlines an area with a high concentration
138. Proposed Amendments, supra note 137, at 2; Memorandum of the General Counsel of
Housing and Urban Development to Chester McGuire, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportu-
nity (Aug. 15, 1978).
139. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio
1979).
140. See Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (tenants alleged land-
lord had denied them the rights derived from living in an integrated apartment complex by
refusing to rent to minorities); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (plaintiffs' allegation that they were denied a home mortgage because of defendants'
redlining practice stated a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
The meaning of the term "minority" is now reasonably consistent in federal legislation. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (Supp. 1 1977) (Negroes, Spanish-speaking persons, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, and Aleuts); 41 C.F.R. § 60- 2 11(a) (1979) (Blacks, Spanish-surnamed Americans,
American Indians, and Orientals).
141. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265-66;
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty
Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970). See note 37 supra.
142. 558 F.2d at 1290.
143. E.g., Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Day-
ton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (constitutional violation found where school
district's actions led naturally, probably, and foreseeably to the creation and maintenance of a
dual school system); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1974) (attendance zoning policy of school board indicated purposeful
pattern of segregation).
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of minority residents, either through the outright refusal to sell insurance or
by imposing special terms or conditions, could be held to violate Title VIII.
Congress may, of course, expressly amend the Fair Housing Act to in-
clude insurance company practices within the ambit of the Act's protections.
Denial of property insurance does make the possibility of obtaining owner-
ship of real property more difficult, particularly in states without a FAIR
plan. To the extent that discrimination in the sale of insurance frustrates the
purpose of the Fair Housing Act, those practices should be expressly prohib-
ited. At the present time, a bill to amend the Fair Housing Act 144 pending
before a House subcommittee would prohibit, inter alia, an insurer from
refusing to enter into an insurance contract because of the race, color, or
national origin of persons living in or near the dwelling at risk. 145 No final
action has been taken although hearings before the subcommittee concluded
in June of 1979.146
The Federal Insurance Administration 147
Apart from these statutory remedies, the federal government is not with-
out current authority to initiate studies of insurance industry practices. As
part of its responsibilities under the National Insurance Development Pro-
gram, 148 the recently created Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) is empowered to study a variety of insurance company practices
through the Federal Insurance Administration. 149  At the present time,
the Federal Insurance Administration is authorized to investigate un-
derwriting techniques, insurance and marketing methods, and practices of
private insurers that affect the availability of essential property insurance in
urban areas. 150  For example, an insurer's return on its investments contrib-
144. H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Another bill, H.R. 100, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), pending before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, would prohibit any dis-
crimination in insurance based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
145. Section 804 of the Fair Housing Act would be amended by adding a new section (f).
Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 would be amended by making it unlawful for "a person in the business
of insuring against hazards to refuse to enter into or discriminate in the terms, conditions or
privileges of a contract of insurance against hazards to a dwelling because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, handicap, or national origin of persons owning or residing in or near the dwelling."
H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 804(f) 1980).
146. Originally, H.R. 5200 was proposed during the 95th Congress as H.R. 3504. Hearings
on H.R. 3504 were concluded in July, 1978.
147. The Federal Insurance Administration was transferred to the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency from the Department of Housing and Urban Development on April 1, 1979.
148. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-21 (1976).
149. Under the President's Reorganization Plan No. 3, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1979), reprinted in 5
U.S.C.A. app. II, at 155 (1979 Supp.), the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was transferred to the newly created Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
150. The statutory responsibilities of FIA, HUD, have been transferred in toto to FEMA.
Those duties relevant to this discussion are set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-16 (1976).
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utes to that company's surplus. That surplus in turn determines in signifi-
cant part the amount of insurance an insurer legitimately may write (with due
regard to solvency concerns). 151 To the extent that investments control un-
derwriting, therefore, the Federal Insurance Administration would seem to
have the present authority to investigate practices.
The authority of the Federal Insurance Administration to initiate studies of
practices to determine the availability of property insurance in urban areas is
part of its authority to carry out the purposes of the federal FAIR plan and
the federal crime insurance program. 152  Such studies, however, are not
authorized under the Fair Housing responsibilities of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Thus, any sanctions available under the
Fair Housing Act are not available to the Federal Insurance Administration
even if a study of insurer practices concludes that insurers are engaging in
investment practices the effect of which is to disproportionately deny insur-
ance to members of racial minorities unless the Fair Housing Act itself can
be legitimately construed to include insurance practices. 153
The FAIR plan does not require any certification of nondiscrimination by
participating insurers in their voluntary market practice. 154 Under the
FAIR plan, of course, no risk may be refused essential property insurance
unless the property itself fails to meet reasonable underwriting standards as
determined by inspection. 155 Violation of the federal requirements for a
state fair housing program would subject the entire FAIR plan to withdrawal
of the approval of the Federal Insurance Administration and, consequently,
render participating insurers ineligible for riot reinsurance.15 6 There appear
to be no sanctions directly available to the Federal Insurance Administration
under its present authority to investigate insurer practices in the voluntary
market, however, even where such investigations reveal either intentional or
effective racially discriminatory practices.
The Fourteenth Amendment
The fourteenth amendment states in the pertinent part of section 1: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
151. INSURANCE REDLINING, supra note 20, at 21-22.
152. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-16 (1976).
153. The present Fair Housing Act permits private litigation by an aggrieved party as well as
pattern and practice suits by the Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3613 (1976). The pro-
posed amendments to the Fair Housing Act provide for administrative relief including cease and
desist orders, H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 804 (1980).
154. Telephone interview with Frank Reilly, Assistant Administrator, Office of FIA, FEMA
(July 19, 1979).
155. 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-3 (1979).
156. Id. § 1749bbb-7, -9.
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tection of the laws."' 1 57  Thus, both the due process and equal protection
clauses protect individuals against the misuse of power by the states. That
protection does not extend, however, to the actions of private persons. 158  It
consistently has been held that to find ostensibly private conduct to be viola-
tive of either clause, a threshold finding of "state action" must be made. 159
Where the challenged action is the positive act of the state itself, the
presence of state action is clear. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 160 for exam-
ple, where the state enacted legislation authorizing "habitual criminals" to
be sterilized, the conduct that allegedly violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment was unequivocally "state action." 161 In other
cases, the acts complained of were not those of the state but rather those of
individuals bearing some special relationship to the state. It was in this area
of private conduct that the Supreme Court first expanded and subsequently
constricted the scope of "state action."
Prior to the early 1970's, the Court developed several theories under
which, to varying degrees, it held the conduct of private individuals to be
tantamount to "state action" under the fourteenth amendment. In Marsh v.
Alabama, 162 the Court determined that the activities of a privately owned
company town were "functionally equivalent" to those of a municipality. 163
Therefore, those acts were held to constitute "state action" under the four-
teenth amendment. 164 Subsequently, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 165 the Court
found that restrictive covenants in real estate contracts between private per-
sons, upheld by a state court, constituted private action backed up or en-
forced by "state action."' 166
The parameters of "state action" were expanded further in Burton v. Wil-
inington Parking Authority, 167 when the Supreme Court found "state action"
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
158. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
159. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
160. Id. (struck down Oklahoma sterilization statute covering habitual felons as violative of
the equal protection clause).
161. Id. at 541.
162. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). This case involved an action for violation of first amendment free
speech rights caused by the management of a company town. The Court found state action to
be present as a result of its comparison of the town services to those of municipality.
163. Id. at 508.
164. Id. at 506.
165. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the petitioners claimed judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants denied them access to housing in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 7.
The Court held: "That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is
to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court." Id. at 14.
166. Id. at 13-14.
167. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In this case, the plaintiff was denied service because of his race by
a restaurant located in a publicly owned parking facility. He claimed that the denial violated the
equal protection clause. Id. at 716. The Court held:
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
in a "symbiotic relationship" between a private business and a publicly-
owned service. 168 This case involved racial discrimination by a private res-
taurant that leased space from a public parking garage. 169
Another theory on which the Supreme Court based its expansion of "state
action" was set forth in Reitman v. Mulkey. 170 There, California had
amended its constitution to bar the state and local municipalities from legis-
latively prohibiting racial discrimination in housing. 171 The Supreme Court
held that this state constitutional provision violated the federal Constitution
because it "encouraged and supported" private racial discrimination, 172 and
as such was "state action."
The development of situations in which the "nonobvious involvement of
the State in private conduct" 1 7 3 was sufficient to become cognizable state
action ended abruptly in 1972 with the Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis1
74
decision. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the six-man majority, emphasized
that the Moose Lodge was a genuinely private club and that such clubs
could discriminate in the selection of members with impunity. 175 The
Court held that the granting of a state liquor license to a private club did not
constitute "state action" under the fourteenth amendment. 176 Accordingly,
the state was found not to be jointly participating in the racially discrimina-
tory practices, nor encouraging them, nor existing in a symbiotic relationship
with the club through its issuing of the liquor license. 177 Therefore, the
club's racially discriminatory practices were held not to be those of the
state. 178
Finally, in 1974, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 179 the Court
further restricted the circumstances in which it would find state action. The
Addition of all these activities, obligations, and responsibilities of the Authority, the
benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is
operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a public parking service,
indicates that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.
Id. at 724.
168. Id. at 723-26.
169. Id. at 716. The mutual benefit theory developed in Burton recently was applied by the
Michigan Supreme Court to that state's no-fault insurance act. Shavers v. Kelley, 402 Mich.
554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978), cert. denied sub. norn Allstate Insurance Company v. Kelley, 99 S.
Ct. 2869 (1979). The court determined that the state was carrying out a general welfare scheme
through insurance companies with the legislative no-fault plan and found state action in the
challenged policies of the insurer. Id. at 597, 267 N.W.2d at 86.
170. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
171. Id. at 371.
172. Id. at 376-81.
173. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 722.
174. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
175. Id. at 171, 175.
176. Id. at 177.
177. Id. at 175-77.
178. Id.
179. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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defendant utility company had discontinued service to an individual for al-
leged nonpayment of bills without prior notice, even though the company's
tariff filed with the state provided that service could be discontinued only on
reasonable notice. 180 Thus, the company had violated its own procedures
and the state had failed to bring the company into conformance with its own
tariff approved by the state regulatory agency. Justice Rehnquist, again writ-
ing for a six-man majority, determined that the state must be significantly
involved in tile particular actions under attack. 181 There must be, in the
language of the Court, "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."' 1 82  Extensive state regulation,
according to the Court, even a state grant of monopoly status to a company,
does not, standing alone, constitute such a sufficiently close nexus. 183
In the earlier cases-in Burton, for example-the Court had required a
less direct connection between the alleged state involvement and the chal-
lenged conduct. In the Jackson opinion, the Court held that the state's con-
duct must be, in effect, the challenged conduct. Furthermore, with Jackson,
the state's passive acquiescence to the challenged conduct is insufficient to
constitute encouragement of that conduct by the state for purposes of finding
"state action." Thus, the Court has made it considerably more difficult for a
litigant to pass beyond the threshold issue of the presence of state action.
The Jackson case also limited the reach of the fourteenth amendment by
declaring that providing essential public services is not equivalent to state
action. 184 According to Jackson, grocers, physicians, and many others pro-
vide essential services. 185 To hold that the acts of such providers become
those of the state would effectively destroy the important and well-
established dichotomy between state and private action. In addition, the
Jackson opinion pointed out that all corporations are creatures of state law
and subject to varying degrees of state regulation. 186 To hold that state
regulation itself involves the state in allegedly prohibited conduct also would
destroy the public-private distinction. Thus, Moose Lodge and Jackson
clearly suggest that the scales are not likely to shift in favor of a threshold
finding of "state action" in private conduct in the near future.
In analyzing whether challenged conduct violates the due process or equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the Court first will look at
the threshold issue of state action. Only when state action has been found in
the substantive challenged conduct itself will that conduct be scrutinized
under the various due process or equal protection tests. Therefore, in con-
180. Id. at 346-47.
181. Id. at 350-51.
182. Id.
183. Id at 352.
184. Id. at 353-54.
185. Id. at 354.
186. Id. at 350.
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sidering whether insurance company practices may be challenged as violative
of the fourteenth amendment, it is necessary first to look at the involvement
of the state in those practices. Only if the state is significantly involved in
the discriminatory or unfair practices themselves would the Court be likely
to judge those practices against the traditional fourteenth amendment stan-
dards. This threshold question requires an analysis of the relationship be-
tween the private insurance industry and the state within the currently ap-
plicable theoretical framework being utilized by the Supreme Court.
Equal protection constraints on insurance redlining
Insurance companies are subject to heavy regulation by the states in
which they are licensed to do business. 187 The Supreme Court, in 1869,
expressly recognized the power of the states to so regulate in the crucial case
of Paul v. Virginia. 188 Since that time, federal and state regulators, insurers,
and insurance-related organizations all have pushed for a continuation of
state control. 189
By contrast, as noted earlier, the federal government consistently has
backed away from regulation of the insurance industry. In 1944, however,
the Supreme Court determined for the first time that the business of in-
surance was a matter of interstate as opposed to exclusively intrastate
commerce. 190 As a result, insurance company practices necessarily became
subject to federal antitrust laws. The following year, Congress accepted the
judicial invitation to exempt insurance companies from federal antitrust laws
and enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act. 191 Under
this Act, insurance companies became exempt from antitrust laws to the ex-
tent of state regulation. Thus, the federal government through an act of posi-
tive law expressly relegated the regulation of the insurance industry to the
states.
State regulators also have acted to keep the power of regulation over the
insurance industry in their hands. For example, the constitution of the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) lists as one of the or-
ganization's purposes: preserving to the "States the regulations of the busi-
ness of insurance."1 92 Also, the NAIC routinely promulgates model uniform
insurance provisions that are submitted to state legislators across the country
for enactment.
187. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 (1977).
188. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). See note 38 supra.
189. Article 2 of the NAIC Constitution states that one of its principal purposes is to promote
national uniformity in insurance law and regulation.
190. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See notes
46-53 and accompanying text supra.
191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
192. NAIC CONST. art 2.
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Thus, almost every aspect of the insurance business, from rates and in-
vestments through policy forms, is regulated at the state level. 193 Further,
many states have legislatively created a residual insurance organization such
as the FAIR plan. 194 In addition, the states have enacted unfair trade prac-
tices acts that make certain discriminatory conduct such as discrimination
based on race, national origin, sex, or marital status unlawful. 195
In Illinois, for example, the refusal to provide homeowners insurance
solely on the basis of geographic location now is a prohibited trade prac-
tice. 196 In addition, the refusal to renew a fire and extended coverage
property insurance policy in effect for five years or more is prohibited unless
the refusal is based upon misrepresentation or fraud in securing the contract,
a measurable increase in the risk originally accepted by the insurer, or at
least sixty days prior notice of the insurer's intent not to renew. 197 Dis-
crimination between individuals or between similar risks based on race,
color, religion, or national origin also is barred. 198
A review of state insurance and public utility codes reveals many
similarities between the respective practices that are regulated by the
states. 199 In both cases, there is extensive statutory and administrative reg-
ulation of the conduct of the companies, both of their internal financial
policies and of their practices in regard to consumers. Of the two types of
industries, however, the insurance industry is probably subject to more ex-
press state prohibitions against racial discrimination than are the public
utilities. State action, therefore, has not created, through legislative or reg-
ulatory enactment, racially discriminatory conduct of the kind prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment. 200
193. Illinois is the only state that is currently lacking a rating law. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
73, § 1065.18-1 to .34 (1971); ILL. INS. RECS. 7A. 04 (1972).
194. In Illinois, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.69-77 (1977). The purpose of the plan is:
to make basic property insurance available in urban areas and to public educational
institutions through the establishment of an Industry Placement Facility for ad-
ministering a FAIR plan (Fair Access to Insurance Requirements), and a Joint Rein-
surance Association for the equitable distribution and placement of risks among
companies transacting property insurance business in the State of Illinois.
id. § 1065.69.
195. In Illinois, see id. § 1031(3). For the text of § 1031(3), see note 79 supra.
196. Id. § 767.22 (Supp. 1978). In addition, a policy of fire and extended coverage may not
be nonrenewed, inter alia, because of the location of the property. Id. § 755.21a(b) (1977).
197. Id. § 755.21.1 (Supp. 1978). A complementary provision provides that nonpayment of
premiums, fraud and misrepresentation, or any act that measurably increases the risk initially
accepted are the only bases for cancellation of fire and extended coverage policies in effect for
one year. Id. § 755.21 (1977).
198. Id. § 1031(3). In addition, a policy of fire and extended coverage may not be non-
renewed, inter ilia, for reasons of race, color or national ancestry. Id. § 755.21a(c).
199. E.g., id. chs. 73, 111 2/3.
200. Rights and Remedies Hearings, supra note 5, at 201 (testimony of Stephen I. Martin,
Vice President, The Hartford Group). Michigan, for example, expressly prohibits refusing to
insure, refusing to renew or limiting the amount of coverage based on race. MICH. COMP.
LAws § 500.2027 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.12027 (Callaghan Supp. 1979)). Minnesota and Wis-
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Further, according to the analysis set forth in Jackson, in order to impli-
cate a state in allegedly unconstitutional private conduct, a significant
"nexus" must be demonstrated between the precise conduct attacked and
the actions of the state. 201 The state's involvement in the private sector
through general regulation is insufficient to meet the "nexus" test. Thus, if a
private insurance company is discriminating against applicants for insurance
on the basis of race, the state will be involved for the purpose of finding
"state action" only if the state can be shown to be involved in the racially
discriminatory practices themselves, either directly through positive order or
indirectly through support and encouragement.
In the majority of jurisdictions, it would be possible to show only the
state's acquiescence to racially discriminatory practices. Whether the failure
of state regulatory officers to overturn discriminatory actions of insurers qual-
ifies as "state action" is a delicate question. In Jackson, the Supreme Court
determined that a state's passive acceptance did not constitute "state ac-
tion. "202 That holding was premised, however, on a finding that the
acceptance "amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania
utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired."2 0 3
In most states, racial discrimination is unlawful and in some states, includ-
ing Illinois, geographic redlining is illegal. 204 Therefore, if the state reg-
ulator permits such prohibited discrminatory practices to continue without
taking proper action to restrain such insurers acting outside the law, it could
be argued that the state is encouraging and authorizing this conduct. 205
The theory may in fact be difficult to sustain. First, insurers do not main-
tain express racial classifications. Instead, they classify property risks on such
bases as age of structure, type of construction, and other factors allegedly
associated with loss experience. 206 Thus, it is possible for insurers to dis-
consin prohibit classification of risks based on race. MINN. STAT. § 70A. 05(2) (1976); Wis.
STAT. § 625.12(2) (1977). In almost all states, unfair discrimination, i.e., discrimination based on
other than loss related factors, is prohibited.
201. 419 U.S. at 350-51.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 357.
204. See note 196 supra.
205. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). This case involved a constitutional ref-
erendum in California in which an amendment to the state constitution was ratified. The
amendment stated:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person who is willing or desires to sell, lease
or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such
property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Id. at 371. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's judgment
that this amendment violated the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause because the
provision would make the right to discriminate a basic policy of the state. Thus the state
would be involved in the encouragement of private discrimination. Id. at 381.
206. PRICING AND MARKETING, supra note 15, at 189. In addition, Illinois prohibits geo-
graphic redlining only to the extent that location of risk may not be the sole basis for refusing to
insure. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.22 (1977). This section provides:
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guise racial or geographic redlining that itself masks racial discrimination
by developing classifications that bear a direct relationship to loss experi-
ence2 0 7 and an indirect relationship to racial or ethnic factors. Thus, as in
Jackson, a regulator's failure to restrain the practices culminating in dis-
crimination against minorities would at most be a determination that he or
she found the conduct permissible under state law. 208
After Jackson, the state's failure to overturn indirectly discriminatory prac-
tices, except where the regulator knows the insurer is violating state law and
fails to restrain the violation, probably will be insufficient to implicate the
state in those practices for purposes of the "state action" doctrine. 209 Fur-
thermore, even the essential nature of insurance, the unique relationship
between the insurance industry and the public interest recognized in Ger-
man Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis 210 will not sustain a "state action" req-
uisite. As stated in Jackson, "affected with the public interest" means only
that an industry is subject to state control. The phrase does not mean that
such businesses are "state actors."
' 211
No company authorized to transact in this State the kinds of business described in
Classes 2 and 3 of Section 4 shall upon proper application refuse to provide
homeowners insurance solely on the basis of the specific geographic location of the
real property or building sought to be insured. "Homeowners insurance," for pur-
poses of this Section, means the personal multi-peril property coverage commonly
known as homeowners insurance.
In addition, location, age of property, and race or ethnicity may not be the bases of a decision
to nonrenew a contract of property insurance. Id. § 755.21a. The section provides:
Nonrenewal of fire and extended coverage policy-Grounds. A policy of fire and
extended coverage insurance, as defined in Section 143.13(b), may not be non-
renewed for any of the following reasons:
(a) age of property,
(b) location of property,
(c) age, sex, race, color, ancestry or occupation of occupants.
Varying terms and conditions on the basis of location, however, is not prohibited.
207. Address by L. Jordan, General Counsel, State Farm Insurance Company, Insurance
Redlining and Reinvestment: Directions for Change Conference (Chicago, Ill., Mar. 23, 1979).
The "business necessity" defense that underlies this argument, of course, is valid only where
racial discrimination is an inadvertent effect and not the purpose of the challenged conduct and
where the challenged conduct is itself essential to accomplish a compelling business purpose.
E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. at 431; United States v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 464 F.2d
301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The "business necessity" issue
would, of course, also arise under §§ 1981, 1982, and Title VIII.
208. The fourteenth amendment would not prohibit discrimination based on age of housing,
or loss experience where there is no purposeful discrimination against a protected group. E.g.,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265-66; Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1976).
209. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Jackson case on the "state action"
doctrine, see Nolte, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytical
Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DICK. L. REV. 315 (1977).
210. 233 U.S. 389, 415 (1914).
211. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 353, quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
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Because private insurers practicing overt racial or ethnic discrimination
have not been ordered or permitted by the state to do so, and because
states expressly prohibit invidious racial discrimination, the requisite ele-
ment of "state action" would seem to be absent from a claim that the equal
protection clause has been violated. Therefore, the substantive question of
whether racial discrimination in the sale of insurance violates that clause will
not be reached. It seems likely that as long as the theoretical underpinnings
of Jackson prevail, an equal protection claim of racial discrimination in
cases of geographic redlining by insurers will fail.
A different conclusion, however, was reached in Stern v. Massachusetts
Indemnity & Life Insurance Co., 212 where the plaintiff alleged sex discrimi-
nation in violation of the fourteenth amendment. In that situation state law
specifically authorized discrimination between insureds based on sex. 2 13 Un-
like the use of race as a basis for underwriting decisions in property insur-
ance at issue here, the sex discrimination in Stern occurred directly as a
result of legislation. Clearly the initiative for the challenged sex discrimina-
tion came from the state, who had "put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it." 2 1 4 That is the level of state involvement
that is likely to pass the Jackson hurdle.
Due process constraints on declinations and terminations
of property insurance
The threshold question of "state action" is the same under the due process
clause as under the equal protection clause. The Jackson 215 case was in fact
a challenge to the procedures employed by the public utility in terminating
service, while Moose Lodge 216 was grounded in the equal protection clause.
In both cases, by addressing the "state action" question first, the Court
never reached the question whether a property right to which constitutional
due process protections attached had been violated.
Were it not for the Jackson rationale, it would seem reasonable to argue
that when a state such as Illinois mandates that insurance cannot be de-
clined, terminated, or nonrenewed except for limited reasons, the state has
created a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to property insurance. 217 That
is, the state by positive act of law created a constitutionally cognizable prop-
erty interest. Given such a property interest, the procedures enacted or pur-
212. 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (allegation that insurance company refused to sell
disability insurance to women under the same terms and conditions available to men, solely on
the basis of sex, was sufficient to state a cause of action based on a violation of equal protection).
213. Id. at 438.
214. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 357.
215. Id. at 348.
216. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).
217. Perry v. Sindenmann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1973) (state college instructor who was dis-
missed without an explanation or hearing was entitled to show he had "a legitimate claim of
entitlement to job tenure").
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sued by the state to protect that interest would be entitled to review by
the courts to determine their adequacy for purposes of the due process
clause. However, as in Jackson, it is unlikely that "state action" would be
found in cancellation and nonrenewal procedures by insurers sufficient to
meet the threshold requirement.
Recently, however, in a suit against, inter alia, private insurers challeng-
ing the Michigan no-fault automobile insurance law, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that the Act violated federal due process protections. In Shavers
v. Kelly, 218 the court determined, first, that "state action" was present be-
cause the state was carrying out a general welfare scheme through private
insurance companies under the no-fault insurance act. Second, the court
found that the total absence of procedures whereby an individual could
complain about placement in the Act's mandated, involuntary "Automobile
Placement Facility" violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 219 That is, under the Michigan no-fault provision, no legal
remedy whatsoever had been established for an individual to grieve the re-
fusal of a private insurer to provide insurance coverage. The Shavers case,
because of its unique facts, apparently skirted the Jackson hurdle.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
State constitutions should not be overlooked as potential bases on which to
ground an action challenging the racially discriminatory practices of property
insurers. Each state constitution approaches issues of racial discrimination
uniquely. There is, however, enough uniformity among the states to permit
at least a brief discussion here.
A number of state constitutions echo the language of the Declaration of
Independence concerning the inalienable rights of persons, including the
right to acquire, possess, and protect property. 220 More importantly, sev-
eral states guarantee that no person shall be deprived of the equal protection
of the law and/or that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. 221 As discussed earlier, insurance contracts are personal
218. 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978), cert. denied sub. nor Allstate Ins. Co. Kel-
ley, 99 S. Ct. 2869 (1979) (where one may not be licensed to drive unless a participant in state's
no-fault insurance program, all persons are entitled to such insurance protection because the
operation of an automobile is crucial to an individual's day-to-day living).
219. Id. at 604-05, 267 N.W.2d at 89-90.
220. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3;
HAWAU CONST. art. I, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 1; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4;
ME. CONST. art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1; MONT. CONST. art. 3, § 3; NEV. CONST.
art. 1, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.D.
CONST. art. 1, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 1; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art. .1, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 1; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art.
3, § 1.
221. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 7; ALASKA CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 7; ARIZ. CONST.
art. 2, §§ 4, 13; ARK. CONST. art. 2, §§ 3, 21; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (equal protection and
due process clauses); COLO. CONST. art. 2, §§ 6, 25; CONN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 20; FLA.
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property. 222 Therefore, the right to purchase a contract of property insur-
ance is a property right that should be within the scope of state constitu-
tional due process protections.
The likelihood that the conduct of private insurers lies outside the sphere
of activity protected by the fourteenth amendment as currently interpreted
by the Supreme Court already has been reviewed. 223 It is the necessity for
finding active state involvement in the challenged conduct itself that has
recently defeated claims against private persons and businesses based upon
federal civil rights law enacted under the fourteenth amendment. 224 The
federal and state parameters of due process and equal protection, however,
are not necessarily the same. One significant difference lies in the absence
of express language in most state constitutions prohibiting only state ac-
tion. 225
It is entirely possible under state constitutional interpretation that racially
discriminatory conduct by private insurers left uncorrected by state law vio-
lates state guarantees of due process and/or equal protection. This is so be-
cause courts interpreting state strict liability constraints are not limited by
the Jackson rationale requiring active state involvement in the allegedly vio-
lative private conduct itself. Thus, racially discriminatory conduct by private
insurers that is either prohibited by state law and uncorrected by the insur-
ance regulatory officer, or permitted by state law in its failure to prohibit the
conduct, may be violative of state equal protection and/or due process
guarantees based on general state legislative and regulatory responsibility
regarding insurers.
Illinois recently has moved even further than other states in protecting the
right to property. Since 1970, Illinois has constitutionally forbidden discrimi-
CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 9; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 1, & § 2, 3; HAW. CONsT. art. 1, § 4 (equal
protection and due process clauses); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (equal protection and due process
clauses); IND. CONST. art. 1, §§ 12, 23; IA. CONST. art, 1, §§ 1, 9; Ky. CO NST. amend. 14, § 1
(equal protection and due process clauses); LA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3; ME. CONST. art. 1, §
6-A (equal protection and due process clauses); MD. CONS'r. art. 23 (due process clause); MASS.
CONST. pt. 1, arts. 1, 10; MICH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 17; MINN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 7; Miss.
CONST. art. 3, § 14 (due process clause); Mo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 10; MONT. CONST. art. 3, §§
3, 27; NEB. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 3; NEV. CO NST. art. 1, §§ 1, 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, arts. 1, 15;
N.J. CONs'r. art. 1, I (equal protection and due process clauses); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18
(equal protection and due process clauses); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 11; N.D. CONST. art. 1,
§§ 1, 13, OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7 (due process clause); ORE. CONST. art. 1, §§ 10, 20, PA.
CONST. art. 1, § I (due process and equal protection clauses); S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (due
process and equal protection clauses); S.D. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 18; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 8
(due process clause); TEX. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3, 19; UTAH CONST. art. 1,§§ 7, 24; VA, CONST.
art. 1, § 11 (due process clause); WASH. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3, 12; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 10
(due process clause); Wyo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3, 6.
222. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 187-219 and accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 182-83 and accompanying text supra.
225. See R. Helman & W. Whalen, "Constitutional Comunentary," ILL. ANN. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd). See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2, 109.
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nation on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry, and sex in the
sale of property. 226 The legislative history of the Illinois provision indicates
that all property, real and personal, lies within the ambit of the constitu-
tional protection. 227 Refusal to sell an item of personalty to an individual,
for example, because the individual is black or Hispanic clearly violates the
Illinois Constitution. The constitution thus would appear to prohibit racial
discrimination in the sale of property insurance. There is no Illinois case law
whatsoever determining whether for purposes of the Illinois Constitution a
contract of property insurance lies within its ambit. 228 However, the sweep
of the Illinois constitutional provision as indicated by its legislative history
does suggest that all property rights will be afforded protection. It seems
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that property rights created by contracts
of property insurance will receive constitutional protection in Illinois. 229
CONCLUSION
Insurance redlining has clear racial and ethnic overtones. The practice
exists in urban communities with large minority populations. Because of the
relationship between geographic redlining and minority composition of that
area, the practice is prohibited indirectly by a number of federal laws as well
as state constitutions. No federal law and no state constitution, however,
expressly prohibits the practice of geographic redlining. Instead, federal civil
rights laws and some state constitutions prohibit invidious racial and ethnic
discrimination in contract formation and in the sale of property. Because an in-
surance policy is both a contract and property, invidious discrimination in
the sale of property insurance is prohibited by these laws. In addition, fed-
eral antitrust laws probably prohibit geographic redlining, at least where the
redlining decision involves an insurer and at least one other person inde-
pendent of the insurer.
That the consequences of redlining are serious cannot be realistically under-
estimated. Even where residential property insurance is available through
the FAIR plan, economic decline is likely to follow. Placement in the FAIR
plan is a stigma, a badge of inferiority that can be a signal for disinvestment
by other organizations. Therefore, the practice of geographic redlining must
be stopped, either voluntarily by cooperation of insurers or involuntarily by
litigation when insurance regulators fail to exercise their administrative pow-
ers to stop the practice. This article has discussed several of the more sig-
nificant theories of liability in the hope of contributing to the end of urban
insurance redlining.
226. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 17. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
227. Gertz, The Unrealized Expectations of Article 1, Section 17, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PRoc. 283, 292 (1978).
228. Id. at 306.
229. It should be noted that there are no Illinois statutes prohibiting racial or ethnic dis-
crimination in the sale of property. Id. at 296.
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